In a capitalist economy, taxes are the most important instrument by which the political system puts into practice a conception of economic and distributive justice. Taxes arouse strong passions, fueled not only by conflicts of economic self-interest, but by conflicting ideas of fairness. Taking as a guiding principle the conventional nature of private property, Murphy and Nagel show how taxes can only be evaluated as part of the overall system of property rights that they help to create. Justice or injustice (...) in taxation, they argue, can only mean justice or injustice in the system of property rights and entitlements that result from a particular regime. Taking up ethical issues about individual liberty, interpersonal obligation, and both collective and personal responsibility, Murphy and Nagel force us to reconsider how our tax policy shapes our system of property rights. (shrink)

Principles of bcnciiccnce require us to promote the good. If we believe that a plausible mom] conception will contain some such principle, we must address the issue of the demands it imposes on agents. Some writers have defended extremely demanding principles, while others have argued that only principles with limited demands are acceptable. In this paper I su ggest that we 100k at the demands 0f beneficencc in a different way; 0ur concern should not just be with the extent of (...) the demands faced by individual agents. Instead, we should consider how the demands imposed Ol'] an agent by a principle of beneiiccncc are affected by the level of compliance with the principle by others. Act—[email protected], for example, in effect requires each complying agent to shoulder her share of the demands of bcncficcnce plus as many of the shares of noncomplying agents as would be optimal. I suggest that we focus OH this feature ofconsequentialism, and not just on the very high demands it can impose Ol'] individual agents. Thus I defend the View that principles of beneiicence should not demand more of agents as expected compliance by othcr agents decreases, and formulate a principle of bencficcnce that meets this condition. This View about beneiicence and compliance is supported by a particular conception 0f beneiiccnce. Rather than as an aim we each have as individuals, benciicence could be understood as a cooperative project, where each of us aims to promote the good together with others. If s0, it would be natural t.. (shrink)

This paper argues that the disagreement between positivists and nonpositivists about law is substantive rather than merely verbal, but that the depth and persistence of the disagreement about law, unlike for the case of morality, threatens skepticism about law. The range of considerations that can be brought to bear to help resolve moral disagreements is broader than is the case for law, thus improving the prospects of reconciliation in morality. But the central argument of the paper is that law, unlike (...) morality, is a concept-dependent social kind, in the sense that law cannot exist in a society without someone in that society having the concept of law. Since the existence of the social kind law is largely dependent on the existence of the corresponding concept, when different actors have different concepts, they can end up creating different kinds. Hence, the difference between positivists and nonpositivists is not just a conceptual one but is capable of giving rise to different legal norms. (shrink)

A contract theory is an attempt both to make normative sense of contract law as an institutional type and to come up with criteria for the evaluation of the law of any particular place. There is no precise rule telling us how far the prescriptions of a theory can deviate from actually existing contract law and still be a theory of contract — rather than a political proposal to replace contract law with something else. But we can say roughly that (...) contract theory aims to provide normative foundations for the type of legal institution that enforces (some) agreements and unilateral commitments. Having provided an account of the point of having an institution of that general kind, the theory can then be used to evaluate existing examples. (shrink)

Self-Governance and Cooperation offers solutions to two fundamental problems in moral philosophy, one concerning the nature and requirements of morality and the other the nature and requirements of practical reason. Robert Myers’s achievement is not just that his solutions are original and plausible, but that his arguments acknowledge and demonstrate the need to approach the problems as an inseparable pair. Philosophical tradition tells us that questions about the content of morality cannot be answered in isolation from questions about its rational (...) force, and that, even more so, questions about the place of morality in practical reason cannot be answered without taking a stand on contested questions of substantive ethics. Myers’s book is a welcome counterforce to a tendency in contemporary moral philosophy to artificially subdivide the subject. (shrink)

Self-Governance and Cooperation offers solutions to two fundamental problems in moral philosophy, one concerning the nature and requirements of morality and the other the nature and requirements of practical reason. Robert Myers’s achievement is not just that his solutions are original and plausible, but that his arguments acknowledge and demonstrate the need to approach the problems as an inseparable pair. Philosophical tradition tells us that questions about the content of morality cannot be answered in isolation from questions about its rational (...) force, and that, even more so, questions about the place of morality in practical reason cannot be answered without taking a stand on contested questions of substantive ethics. Myers’s book is a welcome counterforce to a tendency in contemporary moral philosophy to artificially subdivide the subject. (shrink)